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Projectively Modal Ontology:

between worlds of St.Lesniewski and W.Soloviov


Vyacheslav Moiseev, Russia, vimo@vmail.ru

Abstract


The paper asserts that every ontology presupposes a basic structure, Ontological Tetrade, which consists of source of predications (“modus”), different predications of the source (“modas”), restricted conditions, under which the predications are formed (“models”), and operation of forming of the predications (“projector”). V.Soloviov used projective intuition of Ontological Tetrade comparing predications with projections of the body. It seems, St.Lesniewski also used a similar intuition in a non explicit form. A new axiomatic system, Projectively Modal Ontology, is offered, where logical means, similar to Lesniewski’ Ontology, are used for the expression of idea of Ontological Tetrade.


Key words. Ontology, Ontological Tetrade, modus, moda, model, projector


  1. Introduction


The paper is devoted to the description of one axiomatical system, which can be called as ^ Projectively Modal Ontology (PMO). This system has two main foundations: 1) one important philosophical concept from the philosophy of Vladimir Soloviov, and 2) logical form similar to logical form of St.Lesniewski’ Ontology.

Breafly speaking

PMO = Soloviov ‘ Content + Lesniewski’ Form

Therefore, I shall say some words about Soloviov approach first of all. Further I shall explain some logical ideas of PMO.


  1. ^ Soloviov’ Ontology


Soloviov philosophy is a sort of Platonism. There exists a Highest Being (“Unity”) and there exist infinite set of principles, which are different aspects of Unity. Together Unity and its aspects form All-Unity (therefore the title of Soloviov philosophy is also “Russian Philosophy of All-Unity”). This is the case of an ierarchial Ontology with maximal and minimal (non-being) elements.

Let us see a typical part of the ierarchy: one more ontologically strong principle (S) and, for example, two its aspects (A1 and A2) – see fig.1.



Soloviov used a projective intuition here, he interpreted aspects A1 and A2 as “projections” of the principal S (see also my book1).

To clear this idea let us see an example of geometrical projections. For example, we have a 3-dimensional body B and two 2-dimensional projections P1 and P2 (see fig.2).




Every projection Pi is made in the framework of a plane: P1 in plane 1, P2 in plane 2. We can speak that every projection is the body B under the condition of the plane of projectivity, i.e.,

Pi is B-under-the-condition-i

“Under the condition” is a functor, which can be called as projector. Finally we obtain

Pi = Bi , where  is projector

This structure can be generalised and we might to write in general case

Ai = SCi , where

S is a synthesis

Ai is an aspect of S

Ci is a restricted condition under which Ai is formed

 is projector, operation of forming of aspects from synthesis and restricted conditions

I shall call these four principles, syntesis, aspect, condition and projector, as ^ Ontological Tetrade.

One of my basic assumptions is a such that any Ontology presupposes an Ontological Tetrade in a definite form. I shall use special terms for all elements of Ontological Tetrade: “modus” for synthesis, “moda” for aspect, “model” for restricted condition and “projector” for projector (see fig.3).



Modus is a principle of variety, space of possibilities

Model is a principle of restriction of variety

Moda is an element of variety, one of the possibilities

Projector is an act of restriction (transformation) of variety to an element

One need to notice that the term “model” is used not in trivial sense here. I wanted to use one Latin root “mod”: mod-us, mod-el, mod-a. Therefore I shall use the term “modal” in the ancient sense of this word expressing an idea of any variation, mod-ification. To differ this sense from the contemporary using of the term “modal” in different modal logics I add word “projectively” to the word “modal”.

I think Ontological Tetrade is a very old philosophical structure. We can find it in Plato, in East Philosophy, etc. For example the following realisations of Ontological Tetrade in some philosophical systems can be demonstrated here




Modus


Model

Moda

Projector


Vedanta

(Shankara)

Brahman

Maja

Visible

Principle

Restriction

of Brahman

Plato

Idea

Matter

Material

thing

Emboding of

Idea to Matter

Spinoza

Substantia

Principle of

Restriction (?)

Modus

Restriction of

Substantia

Freud

Libido

Ego and

Super Ego

Symbols of

Libido

Sublimation



Soloviov connects the idea of Ontological Tetrade with the idea of an Ontological Order ()

SCi  S , i.e.

moda of modus less or equals modus in some ontological sense.

In particular, modus can be represented as moda of itself, i.e., there exists a such model 1S that S1S = S. Model 1S can be called as model unity. It is the case of absence of restricted conditions as a limited case of its zero presence.


  1. ^ Lesniewski’ Ontology


It is well known that Stanislaw Lesniewski was nominalist. Therefore the structure of his Ontology as follows (see fig.4).



There are many strong principles (“things”), every thing is a maximum of own ierarchy. Non maximal elements of ierarchy are more weak kinds of being (general properties of things).

I shall use symbol L for Lesniewski’ functor  (“jest”). Then we have

If (a L b) is true, then a is a thing (strong being),

b is either 1) thing also (then (b L a) and (a =L b) here, where (a =L b) is (a L b  b L a)), or 2) property of thing (and ( b L a) in this case)

We find an example of a relation of modus and moda here: if (a L b) is true, then a is modus, b is moda (see fig.5).



However Lesniewski does not deal explicitely with models and projectors in his Ontology. Nevertheless, it seems, his Ontology (L-Ontology) consists of intuition of Ontological Tetrade also. Therefore we can try to modify L-Ontology to express this idea.


  1. Primary Conclusions




    1. We can find intuition of Ontological Tetrade in Soloviov’ Ontology

    2. We may presuppose a non-explicite presence of Ontological Tetrade in Lesniewski’ Ontology

    3. However both Ontologies are not universal since every is restricted by another

    4. We can try to construct more universal version of Ontology, where the idea of Ontological Tetrade will play a main role

    5. Finally, we may use rich logical means of L-Ontology to decide this task

PMO is an effort to construct a such more universal Ontology. Further I shall describe basic logical aspects of PMO using the term “Ontology” for PMO.


  1. Projectively Modal Ontology



^

Primary Predicate



I use a primary 4-placed predicate Mod, where

Mod(a,b,c,f) can be read as “a is mode of modus b in model c with projector f”

Variables a,b,c have categorial type N, variable f has type /N

Language of Ontology



I accept here almost all the logical means of the language of S.Lesniewski’s “Ontology”. Namely I accept Prothotetics without any changes, syntax of expressions of different categorial types, rules of inference with the exeption of Rule of Extensionality (see below). Prothotetical definitions will be used without any changes. Forms of Ontological definitions will be discussed below. Instead of Lesniewski’s functor  I shall use the predicate Mod.


^ Primary Definitions:


1. Definitions of Co-Ordination


(In all 14 definitions) Dk1…km. Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  хp1...хpnMod(xk,xp),


where Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm) is a definable expression of type S. Expression Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm) contains only free variables xk1,…,xkm of the type , where 1≤kj≤4, j=1,..,m, and type  is either type N, when kj < 4, or type (N,N)/N, when kj = 4. I shall mean under the symbol хp1...хpnMod(xkp) an expression formed by adding of existential quantifiers хp1...хpn to predicate Mod, where variables хp1,...,хpn have type , and  is either type N, when ps < 4, or type (N,N)/N, when ps = 4, while 1≤ps≤4 and s=1,..,n. Predicate Mod contains only variables xk1,…,xkm and хp1,...,хpn such that variable xkj stands at the place number kj in predicate Mod, variable xps stands at the place number ps, and m+n = 4.

For example:


D123. Mod123(a,b,c) : Mod(a,b,c)  fMod(a,b,c,f),

where “Mod(a,b,c)” is read as “a is mode of modus b under model c”


D12. Mod12(a,b) : Moda(a,b)  cfMod(a,b,c,f),

where “Moda(a,b)” is read as “a is mode of modus b”


D23. Mod23(b,c) : Model(c,b)  af Mod(a,b,c,f),

where “Model(c,b)” is read as “c is model for modus b”


D1. Mod1(a) : Moda(a)  bcf Mod(a,b,c,f),

where “Moda(a)” is read as “a is mode”


D2. Mod2(b) : Modus(b)  acf Mod(a,b,c,f),

where “Modus(b)” is read as “b is modus”


D3. Mod3(c) : Model(c)  abf Mod(a,b,c,f),

where “Model(c)” is read as “c is model”


D4. Mod4(f) : Projector(f)  abcMod(a,b,c,f),

where “Projector(f)” is read as “f is projector”


2. Definitions of Weak Inclusions and Weak Equalities


DI ik1,…,km. a ik1,…,km b  xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(...a...)  yp1...ypnMod(...b...)).

DE ik1,…,km. a ik1,…,km b  xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(...a...)  yp1...ypnMod(...b...)).


(in all 28 definitions of the first type and of the second)


These expressions designate that variables xk1,…,xkm stand at the places number k1,…, km accordingly, variables yp1,..., ypn stand at the places number p1,..., pn accordingly in predicates Mod. Then m+n = 3, all i-s, kj-s and ps-s, where j=1,.., m, s=1,.., n, do not equal between each other. Terms а and b stand at place number i in the predicates Mod. Variables with index 4 (standing at the place number 4 in predicates Mod) are variables of type /N. Another variables have type N.

For example, moduses can be equale to each other on the following seven bases:

a 21 b  x1(y3y4Mod(x1,a,y3,y4)  y3y4Mod(x1,b,y3,y4)) – equality by modes

a 23 b  x3(y1y4Mod(y1,a,x3,y4)  y1y4Mod(y1,b,x3,y4)) – equality by models

a 24 b  x4(y1y3Mod(y1,a,y3,x4)  y1y3Mod(y1,b,y3,x4)) – equality by projectors

a 21,3 b  x1x3(y4Mod(x1,a,x3,y4)  y4Mod(x1,b,x3,y4)) – equality by modes and models

a 21,4 b  x1x4(y3Mod(x1,a,y3,x4)  y3Mod(x1,b,y3,x4)) – equality by modes and projectors

a 23,4 b  x3x4(y1Mod(y1,a,x3,x4)  y1Mod(y1,b,x3,x4)) – equality by models and projectors

a 21,3,4 b  x1x3x4(Mod(x1,a,x3,x4)  Mod(x1,b,x3,x4)) – equality by modes, models and projectors


^ 3. Definitions of Strong Equality


DSE ik1,…,km. a =ik1,…,km b  a ik1,…,km b  Mod(…a…)  Mod(…b…),


where under the designation Mod(…a…) the predicate Mod is meant, in which all the variables, besides variable a, are bounded by existential quantifiers, and variable a stands at the place number i. Index i can accept values from 1 to 4 in the expressions with the index form ik1,…,km, and variable m can vary from 1 to 3 when i is fixed.


For example, the following special equalities and inclusions can be distinguished:


DE21. a 21 b : a  b  c(Moda(c,a)  Moda(c,b)),

where “a  b” is read as “a weakly equals b”


DI21. a 21 b : a  b  c(Moda(c,a)  Moda(c,b)),

where “a  b” is read as “a is weakly included into b”


DI23. a 23 b : a * b  x(Model(x,a)  Model(x,b)),

where “a * b” is read as “a weakly equals b by models”


4. A one special case of Equality

I shall use the following equality also:


DE. a = b  Moda(a,b)Moda(b,a),

where “a = b” is read as “a equals b”


5. Valency Definitions:


DPMODA1. PModa(a)  b(Moda(b,a)  Moda(a,b))  Moda(a),

where “PModa(a)” is read as “a is positive (not null) mode”


DNMODA. NModa(a)  b(Moda(b)  Moda(a,b))  Moda(a),

where “NModa(a)” is read as “a is negative (null) mode”


DNMODUS. NModus(a)  b(Model(b)  Model(b,a))  c(Moda(c,a)  NModa(c))  Modus(a),

where “NModus(a)” is read as “a is negative (null) modus”


DPMODA2. PModa(a,b)  Moda(a,b)  PModa(a),

where “PModa(a,b)” is read as “a is positive (not null) mode for modus b”


DPMODUS. PModus(a)  bPModa(b,a),

where “PModus(a)” is read as “a is positive (not null) modus”


DIMODUS. IModus(a)  Modus(a)  b(Modus(b)  Moda(b,a)),

where “IModus(a)” is read as “a is infinite modus”


DAT. At(a)  PModus(a)  b(PModa(b,a)  b=a), here “At(a)” is read as “a is atom”


DPE. a  b  PModa(a,b)  PModa(b,a),

where “a  b” is read as “a is positively equivalent to b”

^

Axioms of Ontology



(AO1) Moda(a,b)  Modus(a)  d(Moda(b,d)  Moda(a,d))  Moda(b,b)


(AO2) Mod(a,b,c,f)  (a =1234 f(b,c))  aMod(a,b,c,f)


-Notation


D1. a  b  Moda(b,a), where “a  b” is read as “a is b”

DP. a 1 b  PModa(b,a), where “a 1 b” is read as “a positively is b”

D*. a * b  Model(b,a), where “a * b” is read as “b is model for modus a”


Existential definition


DEx. Ex(a)  PModa(a), where “Ex(a)” is read as “a exists”

^

Ontological Definitions



Dik1,…,km.

Mi  [xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(xk,C,yp)  Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  (xk1,…,xkm))],


where variables xk1,…,xkm stand at the places number k1,…, km accordingly, variables yp1,..., ypn stand at the places number p1,..., pn accordingly in the first predicate Mod. Then m+n = 3, all i-s, kj-s and ps-s, where j=1,.., m, s=1,.., n, do not equal between each other. Term C is a definable term and C stands at the place number i in the first predicate Mod. All these conditions are designated by the symbol Mod(xk,C,yp). Variables with index 4 (standing at the place number 4 in predicates Mod) are variables of type /N. Another variables have type N.

Finally, Mi is

1. Expression xk1…xkmt((xk1,…,xkm)  x2  t  ((xk1,…,xkm))x2[t]) iff i=1 and there exists kj = 2 between all kj, where j=1,2,…,m. Expression ((xk1,…,xkm))x2[t] is the result of substitution of variable t for variable x2 in expression (xk1,…,xkm).

2. Expression xk1…xkmt((xk1,…,xkm)  t  x1  ((xk1,…,xkm))x1[t]) iff i=2 and there exists kj = 1 between all kj, where j=1,2,…,m. Expression ((xk1,…,xkm))x1[t] is the result of substitution of variable t for variable x1 in expression (xk1,…,xkm).

3. p(pp) in the other cases, where p is a propositional variable.


If the definable term is a functor F of the categorial type a = b/, where type  is either type N, when kj < 4, or type /N, when kj = 4, and b is also a categorial type, then I shall accept the following more general scheme of Ontological Definitions:


Daik1,…,km.

Mi  [xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(xk,F(),yp)  Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  (xk1,…,xkm,))],


where notation is the same as earlier and, besides, is a sequence (a1,a2,…,aN) of arguments of F, and symbol  is a1a2…aN.

Here Mi is

1. Expression xk1…xkmt((xk1,…,xkm,)  x2  t  ((xk1,…,xkm,))x2[t]) iff i=1 and there exists kj = 2 between all kj, where j=1,2,…,m. Expression ((xk1,…,xkm,))x2[t] is the result of substitution of variable t for variable x2 in expression (xk1,…,xkm,).

2. Expression xk1…xkmt((xk1,…,xkm,)  t  x1  ((xk1,…,xkm,))x1[t]) iff i=2 and there exists kj = 1 between all kj, where j=1,2,…,m. Expression ((xk1,…,xkm,))x1[t] is the result of substitution of variable t for variable x1 in expression (xk1,…,xkm,).

3. p(pp) in the other cases, where p is a propositional variable.


I shall call property (xk1,…,xkm) or (xk1,…,xkm,) as modal (modus) property iff the case 2 (1) takes place.

For example, we have


D21. ab(P(a)  a  b  P(b))  [a(C  a  Moda(a)  P(a))] – the case of modal definition of modus C. Condition ab(P(a)  a  b  P(b)) defines property P as modal property here.


D12. ab(Q(a)  b  a  Q(b))  [a(a  C  Modus(a)  Q(a))] – the case of modus definition of mode C. Condition ab(Q(a)  b  a  Q(b)) defines property Q as modus property here.


D23.a(C * a  Model(a)  Q(a)) – the case of model definition of modus C.


D213. abt(P(a,b)  a  t  P(t,b))  [ab(Mod(a,C,b)  Mod13(a,b)  P(a,b)] – the case of modal-model definition of modus C. Condition abt(P(a,b)  a  t  P(t,b)) defines property P as modal property here.


28 kinds of Ontological Definitions of type Dik1,…,km and Daik1,…,km are defined in the general case. I would like to note that Moda(a)  a  a and Modus(a)  a  a. Therefore we can write consequents of D21 and D12 in the forms a(C  a  a  a  P(a)) and a(a  C  a  a  Q(a)) accordingly.

^

Ontological Laws of Extensionality



In general case, the following kinds of Ontological Laws of Extensionality can be accepted in Ontology:


LE ik1,…,km.   ik1…kn   {()  ()},


where  ik1…kn is one of the 28 weak equalities, and variables ,  have type /N, when i = 4, otherwise ,  have type N. Variable Ф has type T()/S, where T() is type of . For example:


LE12. a 12 b  {(a)  (b)}

LE21. a 21 b  {(a)  (b)}

LE1234. a 1234 b  {(a)  (b)}

LE2134. a 2134 b  {(a)  (b)}

LE3124. a 3124 b  {(a)  (b)}

LE4123. f 4123 g  {(f)  (g)},


By analogy corresponding versions of Ontological Laws of Extensionality can be introduced for every categorial type a = b/, where b is also a categorial type and  is N or /N. For example:


LEa12. (a() 12 b())  {(a)  (b)}

LEa21. (a() 21 b())  {(a)  (b)}

LEa1234. (a() 1234 b())  {(a)  (b)}

LEa2134. (a() 2134 b())  {(a)  (b)}

LEa3124. (a() 3124 b())  {(a)  (b)}

LEa4123. (f() 4123 g())  {(f)  (g)},


where is a sequence of arguments of functors a,b,f,g, while a,b have type b/N, and f,g have type b/(/N).

I shall accept the version of Ontology with LE21, LE3124, LE4123, LEa21, LEa3124, LEa4123 below.

Let us say that index form ik1…kn is included into an index form jp1…pm iff i=j and numbers k1,…, kn are between numbers p1,…, pm. One can show that Law of Extensionality LEjp1…pm is infered from the Law of Extensionality LEik1…kn iff index form ik1…kn is included into the index form jp1…pm. For example, acceptane of LE21 (LEa21) permits to prove Laws LE213, LE214, LE2134 (LEa213, LEa214, LEa2134). The same is true for the Law LE12 (LEa12). Besides, we have that equivalence between laws LE21 (LEa21) and LE12 (LEa12) can be proved in Ontology.

^

Some Primary Theorems



Theorem of mode and modus equivalence. Moda(a)  Modus(a), i.e., a is mode iff a is modus.

Theorem of transitivity. Moda(a,b)Moda(b,c)  Moda(a,c), i.e., if a is mode of modus b and b is mode of modus c, then a is mode of modus c.

Theorem of modus order.

  1. Modus(a)  Moda(a,a)

  2. Moda(a,b)  Moda(b,a)  a = b

  3. Moda(a,b)  Moda(b,c)  Moda(a,c)

Theorem of model unity. Modus(a)  b(Model(b,a)  Mod(a,a,b)), i.e., if a is modus, then for some b it is true that b is model for a and a is mode of itself in the model b.

Theorem of relation of equalities. a = b  a =21 b  a =12 b

^ First theorem of existence. Ex(a)  Moda(a,b)  Ex(b), i.e., if a exists and a is mode of b, then b exists.

If we accept the following definitions and new axioms

DA1. (a  b) e x  x e x  a e a  b e b  [y(x e1 y  z(y e1 z  (a e z  b e z)))  NModa(x)], where “(a  b)” is read as “sum of moduses a and b”


DA2. (a  b) e x  x e x  a e a  b e b  [y(x e1 y  (a e y  b e y))  NModa(x)], where “(a  b)” is read as “product of moduses a and b”


DA3. a e x  x e x  a e a  [y(x e1 y  (a e y))  NModa(x)], where “a” is read as “exterior of modus a”

AN. aNModa(a) [^ Axiom of null mode presence]

AS. Moda(a)  Moda(b)  (a e b)  x(b e1 x  y(x e1 y  (a e y))) [Axiom of separation],

then the following important theorem can be proved

Theorem of Boolean algebra on moduses. Operations ,  and  form Boolean algebra on moduses.

^

Theorem of Consistency



Theorem of consistency. If Lesniewski’s protothetics is consistent, then Ontology is also consistent.

To prove the theorem we should to offer an interpretation of Ontology in protothetics. I shall use the following interpretation (I) here:

1. If a is a name variable or constant, then I(a) is a propositional variable or constant accordingly. I shall use a for I(a).

2. If f is a projector, then I(f) is a functor of the type /S. I shall use symbol f for I(f) also.

3. I(Mod(a,b,c,f)) is the formula (af(b,c)  a  f(b,c)  a(bc)  (c  b)). I shall use also the symbol ModS(a,b,c,f) for I(Mod(a,b,c,f)).

In other respects formulas of Ontology do not change in the interpretation.

I shall use sign “=” in the expressions “I(A) = B” (or “B = C”) for the assertion that formula B of protothetics is the interpretation of the formula A of Ontology (or interpretation B equals interpretaton C). I shall sometimes use parentheses […] for secretion of formula B or its equivalent representations.

Further I(b  a) = I(cfMod(a,b,c,f)) = cf(I(Mod(a,b,c,f))) = [cf(af(b,c)  a  f(b,c)  a(bc)  (c  b))]  [c(a(bc))  a]  a  b. Therefore we have:

I(b  a) = a  b.

I(Modus(b)) = [a(ab)]  b

I(b * c) = I(afMod(a,b,c,f)) = af(I(Mod(a,b,c,f))) = [af(af(b,c)  a  f(b,c)  a(bc)  (c  b))]  bc. Therefore we have:

I(b * c) = bc.

For Ontological Definitions

Dik1,…,km.

Mi  [xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(xk,C,yp)  Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  (xk1,…,xkm))],

we obtain

I(Mi  [xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(xk,C,yp)  Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  (xk1,…,xkm))]) = [I(Mi)  (xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnModS(xk,C,yp)  ModSk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  I(xk1,…,xkm)))

The formula xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnModS(xk,C,yp)  ModSk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  I(xk1,…,xkm)) can be infered from the relative prothotetic definition, i.e., it is a theorem of prothotetics. Therefore all conditional is a theorem of prothotetics too.

The same logic is right for the case of Ontological Definitions

Daik1,…,km.

Mi  [xk1…xkm(yp1...ypnMod(xk,F(),yp)  Modk1…km(xk1,…,xkm)  (xk1,…,xkm,))].

Further, the following equalitiy can be proved here:

I(a 21 b) = [с(aс  bс)]  [ab]

Therefore Ontological Law of Extentionality LE21 (LEa21) is transformed to a Prothotetic Law of Extensionality. Another Ontological Laws of extensionality (LE3124, LE4123, LEa21, LEa3124, LEa4123) are transformed to according Prothotetical Laws of Extensionality also.


For axioms of Ontology we obtain:


(AO1) I(b  a  d(d  b  d  a)  b  b  Modus(a)) = [a  b  d((b  d)  (a  d))  (b  b)]– the case of theorem of protothetics.


(AO2) I(Mod(a,b,c,f)  (a =1234 f(b,c))  aMod(a,b,c,f)) =

= [(af(b,c)  a  f(b,c)  a(bc)  (c  b))  (a  f(b,c))  a  f(b,c)  a(af(b,c)  a  f(b,c)  a(bc)  (c  b))] - the case of theorem of protothetics too (here I used the equality I(a =1234 b)  (ab)).

In other syntactical respects Ontology does not differ from L-Ontology (Ontology of Lesniewski) and it is known that if prothotetics is consistent, then L-Ontology is also consistent. Therefore, under this interpretation, all the rules of inference of Ontology become primitive or secondary rules of protothetics. This proves the theorem.



1 V.I.Moiseev “Logic of All-Unity”. Moscow: “Per Se”, 2002. – 415 p. (in Russian)




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